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Introduction
As of 2014, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates
that the number of refugees has exceeded 50 million people in the post-World War II era.1 These
are people who are fleeing from internal conflicts, abusive, corrupt governments, economic
hardships, and social discrimination. The current global refugee crisis affects countless third
parties, including state leaders, host government structures, economic stability, and individuals
other than the refugees themselves. The crisis has the potential to influence the way the
international community will approach future immigration issues, economic policy, and political
relationships. Countries that host these refugees must make key decisions regarding how refugee
influxes will impact their economic, political, and civil stability. Jordan, situated in a conflictridden region, has manifested itself as a refugee state, for it has dealt with refugee influxes since
the United Nations (UN) established Israel as a state in 1948. Since 1948, Jordan has confronted
several refugee influxes, including those fleeing from Palestine, Iraq, and Syria.
The current Syrian refugee crisis in Jordan deems this topic necessary for discussion and
thorough evaluation because it threatens Jordan’s economic and political stability. Amnesty
International reported in February 2016 that Jordan hosts over 635,000 Syrian refugees in
addition to those already in the country. Jordan finds it difficult to provide education to Syrian
children as well as its own population, so the Jordanian Ministry of Education has begun a
double-shift school system. This new school system “groups Jordanian and Syrian refugee
students separately, where the Jordanians attend school in the morning shift, and the Syrians go
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to school in the afternoon shift.”2 The Jordanian monarchy allowed the British Council, an
international organization that promotes educational opportunities, to train Jordanian teachers to
make their lessons more effective to cope with and to place the educational needs of Syrian
children at the forefront of response policy.3 This education shortage is an example of the types
of issues that confront the Jordan government. Other limiting factors that Jordan faces include,
water shortages, residential shortages, health care access, political unrest, et cetera.
In December of 2015, there were over one million people who were either refugees or
asylum-seekers in Jordan, which had a population of 8,117,564 at the time. Jordan’s long history
of confronting mass refugee influxes has conditioned its government to respond in various ways.
Economic, political, and humanitarian responsibility each had a part in influencing the Jordanian
government’s response to the refugee influxes. For instance, King Abdullah I (1946-1951), the
first king of independent Jordan, extended citizenship rights to Palestinians fleeing from Israeli
occupation in 1948.4 Furthermore, Abdullah I’s grandson, King Hussein (1952-1999), recalled
the pan-Arab movement and felt a humanitarian responsibility to Arabs. King Hussein’s son,
King Abdullah II (1999-present) continued this generational tolerance and acceptance of
refugees. Since assuming the throne in 1999, his government has had to navigate through
multiple mass refugee influxes—Iraqis in the 1990s and 2000s and Syrians beginning in 2011.
Jordan is, in a sense, a refugee state.
This paper demonstrates that, though Jordan’s government responses have not always
been accepting and tolerant, the government has consistently reverted back to positive policy
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responses. These positive policy responses are determined through the examination of Karen
Jacobsen’s host government response model, which she outlines in her paper, “Factors
Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes.”5 Her criteria
for determining the policy type that a host government decides to pursue are outlined in the
following sections. This paper will compare Jordan’s multiple refugee influxes to Jacobsen’s
government response model. Determining Jordan’s government response will be useful in
predicting future Jordanian response as it continues to confront the Syrian refugee crisis. In
addition, this study highlights possible policies that governments other than Jordan may choose
to pursue if they are faced with mass refugee influxes. It is a tool which policymakers and
governments alike can utilize to gain a more comprehensive perspective on the implications and
constraints that surround government absorption of refugees.
What Is a Refugee?
Before delving into Jacobsen’s model on host government responses as it applies to the
Jordanian case, it is important to outline and clearly define who qualifies as a “refugee” under
international law. In 1948, the UN General Assembly drafted and implemented resolution 217A,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This document lays out fundamental human rights
that the international community will “universally [protect].”6 Article 14 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is thus:
1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution.
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2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising
from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of
the United Nations.7
Article 14 is the first formalized, legal basis for refugees as autonomous entities in and of
themselves. Since they have a right to seek and to enjoy this asylum, asylum comes with
certain assumptions as to what a safe haven entails. Article 14 is vague as to the rights
that host countries should afford refugees upon allowing them to cross their borders.
Therefore, the UN drafted the 1951 Refugee Convention, which clearly defined a refugee
as someone “unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group, or political opinion.”8 Having this refugee status grants refugees
certain rights, which the Convention’s signatories must abide by. These rights include but
are not limited to the right to employment, housing, education, and an equal share of
resources in short supply. The 1951 Convention “cover[ed] only those persons who have
become refugees as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951,” meaning that
people displaced in various events after 1951 are not covered under this Convention.
However, the United Nations added the 1967 Protocol so that all refugees are guaranteed
the same rights under the Convention regardless of the timeline. The 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol are at the center of international law concerning refugees.
Jordan on Refugees
Since this study focuses on Jordan’s government policies in particular, it is key to
point out that Jordan is not a signatory to either the 1951 Convention or to the 1967
Protocol. The fact that Jordan is not a member of these pivotal pieces of international law
7
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is especially jarring since it has such a long history of refugee relations. However, Jordan
has specific refugee policy written into its domestic legal system, which leaves it flexible
to change. For instance, article 21 of the Jordanian Constitution states:
(i) Political refugees shall not be extradited on account of their political beliefs or
for their defence of liberty.
(ii) Extradition of ordinary criminals shall be regulated by international
agreements and laws.9
This flexibility could allow Jordan to change its refugee regulations rather quickly to adapt to
modern refugee influxes.
Though Jordan is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention and its protocol, it has incorporated
refugee relations and stipulations into its legal framework. Jordan has a system in place that is
meant to address issues that may arise with a mass refugee influx. Broadly, Jordan has
implemented both restrictive and receptive policies concerning refugees. For instance, Jordan
makes gaining a residency permit relatively difficult, for it granted only about 30 percent of Iraqi
refugees residency permits.10 This obstacle, in turn, makes it even more difficult for refugees to
gain work permits that would help them assimilate into Jordanian society. King Abdullah II, the
current Jordanian monarch, however, has expressed his willingness to accept and accommodate
the most recent refugees—those fleeing the Syrian Civil War. The king made a few statements to
that effect, including that “the kingdom’s public services has been under strain after Jordan spent
25 percent of the state budget on helping refugees.”11 This expenditure on refugees demonstrates
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Jordan’s continued commitment to easing the costs associated with resource shortages.12 This
study will determine whether Jordan has and continues to implement positive or negative refugee
policies according to Karen Jacobsen’s model on government responses to refugee influxes.
Theory
Relevant Models
The topic of government crisis management has been a point of discussion for scholars
and politicians for decades, as they seek to understand which are the preferred methods to handle
dire situations. Academics and policymakers have devised several general models for state crisis
management, isolating patterns and trends. Uriel Rosenthal, a Dutch politician and former
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Alexander Kouzmin, a professor at the University of Western
Sydney, state that there are five heuristic steps of government decision-making. Their study
covers various types of crises, including natural disasters, nuclear emergencies, terrorist attacks,
and violent demonstrations. These steps include evaluating if a threat exists to the socio-political
system in the host country; determining a necessity to respond to the threat; specifying the need
of government intervention based on capacity and responsibility of the political and bureaucratic
authorities; determining a temporal response; transitioning from external observations of the
threat to action. This model does not suggest, as Rosenthal and Kouzmin explicitly point out, that
governments are a benevolent influence. The government’s credibility and legitimacy are at risk
because “governments may make decisions to unduly aggravate the crisis… [and] governmental
authorities may lack physical courage” to manage the crisis.13 With these general steps,
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Rosenthal and Kouzmin have outlined loose trends that occur at the state level of crisis
management.
Rosenthal and Kouzmin’s model represents one of the simpler and more applicable ways
that governments deal with crises. Michael Brecher, a professor focused on the study of the
theory of international crises at McGill University, presents a stress-coping-choice model of state
behavior in international crises. He applies his model to various international crises, including
the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Brecher’s independent variable is “stress induced
by perceptions of value threat, time pressure, and the probability of war.”14 His dependent
variable is the government’s choice. An environmental change (the crisis) creates stress, which
then leads to coping while the government attempts to isolate a way to handle the crisis. Coping
is Brecher’s intervening variable where the government engages in information analysis,
consultation, decisional forums, and discussions of alternatives. After the government has gone
through the coping phase, it must make a choice.
Brecher defines a threat as being “the anticipation of harm of some kind, an anticipation
that is created by the presence of certain stimulus cues signifying to the individual [or group] that
there is to be an experience of harm.”15 His model is more centered in a militaristic context, like
the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Korean War, but it remains useful as an analysis of
international crises. Brecher split the time portion of his model into three periods: precrisis,
crisis, and postcrisis. An “increase in perceived threat on the part of decision makers” marks the
precrisis period, beginning the threat evaluation process among state authorities. All three
characteristics of a crisis are present in the crisis period—a rise in perceived threat, the need to
act in a timely fashion, and a high probability of military involvement. The post crisis period
14
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“begins with an observable decline in intensity of one or more of the three perceptual
conditions,”16 and it leads to the end of the crisis. The crisis ends in this stage because “a
decision or cluster of choices in the postcrisis period will lead to a situational change”17 that no
longer stresses the three conditions of a crisis. This model, largely based on military
involvement, is useful to analyze because it adds an international framework through which to
study crisis management. It allows government officials to map out other states’ tentative actions
and their processes for carrying out those actions.
The Jacobsen Model
The Rosenthal and the Brecher models provide general frameworks for government
decision-making. However, there are very few studies that have discussed refugee crises from
the host government’s perspective. Karen Jacobsen, a migration research professor at Tufts
University, conducted a study to isolate the most prominent factors that influence policy
responses of governments hosting refugee influxes. Jacobsen tends to focus on refugee situations
in developing countries. In the International Migration Review, Jacobsen published “Factors
Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Government to Mass Refugee Influxes,”
which seeks to understand “policy responses of asylum governments to mass influxes of
refugees.”18 She particularly wanted to isolate the reasons why less developed host governments
respond generously or restrictively.
First, it is necessary to define key terms in Jacobsen’s research. A refugee influx “refers
to people who flee their country en masse…within a relatively short period (a few years)…large
numbers (thousands)…[as a result of] civil war and insurgency, ethnic or religious persecution,
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environmental disaster, and famine.”19 A government response “refers to actions (or inactions)
taken by the government and other state institutions that include specific refugee policies,
military responses, unofficial actions, and policy implementation.”20
According to Jacobsen’s model, there are three sources of pressure on host government
refugee decision-making. The first source of pressure is from “institutions and individuals in the
international community which are concerned with the welfare of refugees.”21 The primary
institution is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which can, along
with individuals and other institutions, apply pressure by publicizing negative aspects of a
government’s current policies toward refugees and straining diplomatic positions concerning the
refugee crisis. The second, and most affected, source of pressure is the local community
receiving the refugee influx. The local community’s response to a refugee influx determines “the
extent to which the community is willing and able to absorb”22 the refugees. This is a
community’s absorption capacity, and it consists of structural ability and willingness of the
community. Economic capacity (land availability, employment systems, infrastructure, etc.) and
international assistance determine structural ability. Cultural attitudes towards refugees,
perceived length of residence, and historical experiences with refugees determine the willingness
aspect of a community’s absorption capacity.23 The third source of pressure on host governments
is from the refugees themselves. They can threaten to overwhelm the host government through
sheer numbers and will power concerning treatment and accommodation from the host country.
Often, refugees can refer to the UNHCR, lawyers, non-profits, and other international entities
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devoted to refugee welfare.24 These three forms of pressure that can influence a host government
lead it to react to the refugee crisis in three ways.
Jacobsen chooses to outline the choices of host governments in a simple manner; she
states that they only have three types of choices to make regarding a refugee influx. They can do
nothing, react negatively, or react positively. She acknowledges that government decisions are
not black and white and are, therefore, a mixture of all three choice types. By doing nothing the
government “suggests that it either lacks the capacity for action, is unwilling to act, or does not
consider the appearance of refugees as a significant matter for its agenda.”25 The positive and
negative reactions are more complex than the choice type of doing nothing. This is where policy
decisions can neither be purely positive nor purely negative. However, Jacobsen identifies the
most common and most likely policies that would fall under each category. Those responses are
then broken down into three policy types: legal-bureaucratic, international refugee organizations
(IROs), and the admission and treatment of refugees.26 Broadly, positive responses include
defining asylum seekers as refugees, designating a department in the state to deal with refugees,
cooperate with IROs, or considering refugees for local settlement or permanent residency. 27
Negative responses include placing restrictions on movements and employment of refugees,
forcing refugees to live in camps, and having no proper procedures for the determination of
refugee status.
Justification for the Jacobsen Model
In this study, the Jacobsen model will provide the clearest and most concise analysis of
Jordan’s numerous refugee crises since the first wave of Palestinians in 1948 and in 1967. Using
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her model, this study will analyze the Jordanian monarchy’s reactions to refugee crises. Since
most host governments conduct refugee crisis management with a mixture of positive and
negative responses, this model will aid in determining which type of response Jordan generally
adopts. There is an underlying causal chain in this method of analysis, for the refugee crisis leads
to a government response; Jordan has never taken the “do nothing” policy choice. That
government response is the dependent variable in this study. The government response will be
considered over various time periods, with different refugee influxes, then the response will be
examined as a whole to draw conclusions about Jordan’s general response patterns. The primary
independent variables will be the factors that most affect Jordan’s response to refugee influxes.
Following the identification of the factors that influence the government’s decisions, whether
humanitarian, political, or practical, there will be an evaluation of the effects of the decisions.

Three sources of pressure→ government reaction

Jacobsen’s model has outlined this causal chain, and it will be applied to the Jordanian case with
particular attention placed on the Palestinian, Iraqi, and Syrian refugees. The evolution of
Jordan’s decision making will be extrapolated from these cases as examples of Jordan’s long
term refugee history. Jacobsen’s model is useful because it is simple, and it provides a
framework that is focused on refugee influxes in less developed countries. Her model devises a
set of clear, general questions that one can ask while examining a specific refugee crisis. These
questions require mostly “yes” or “no” answers—with a few exceptions added for clarity.
Through quantifying number of “yes” answers in the positive policy categories, one can make a
weighted judgment as to which policy type a host government has implemented—non-reactive,
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positive, or negative. In addition, Jacobsen specifically addresses some of Jordan’s problems
with handling the refugee influxes, such as its slack of structural ability. It does not however,
describe Jordan explicitly, which allows for this study to trace the evolution or refugee policies
over Jordan’s long history of migrant crises due to its generality. Whether the Jordanian
government responds positively or negatively to the current refugee crisis will help determine the
type of intention behind Jordan’s strategies (political, economic, or humanitarian).
This paper will adapt her model to have a more thorough discussion of the effects of
refugee influxes on the Jordanian government. In some situations, a host government may have
to learn from its failures and modify its responses accordingly. For example, Jordan’s first wave
of Palestinian refugees in 1948 prepared it for the 1967 wave of Palestinians because it allowed
the government to prepare and predict the types of problems that arise from refugee influxes,
such as food and housing shortages. Jacobsen’s model will illuminate how the Jordanian
government has responded to mass refugee influxes throughout its history. The intentions and
influences behind Jordan’s refugee policy will be based on the positive or negative responses and
which ones Jordan picks most often.
The Applied Jacobsen Model
The First Palestinian Wave (1948)
May 15, 1948 is known as Nakba Day to millions of Palestinians. Nakba Day marks the
point in the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict where 726,000 Palestinians either fled or a new Israeli
state expelled them from their territories.2829 The Second Session of the United Nations General
Assembly mandated the “partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states,” causing the exodus
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of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to surrounding areas—Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.30
University of Akron professor, Ghazi Falah, believes that the events that led to Nakba Day
“served as catalytic agents for the transformation of Palestine’s cultural landscape”31 through
violence and forced displacement. This is one of the many perspectives that surround the ArabIsraeli conflict. Some scholars and politicians frame the exodus of the Palestinians as if they fled
at the requests of other Arab countries—like Jordan.32 While the origins of this exodus are
significant and relevant, it remains that Jordan bore massive numbers of Palestinian refugees. As
of July 1, 2014, there were 2,097,338 Palestinian refugees in Jordan (total population 6,607,000)
registered with the United Nations (UN).33 Many of the Palestinians in Jordan are descendants of
those from the 1948 and the 1967 refugee influxes, making them second and third generation
Palestinians.
A brief background on the events that led to the first wave of Palestinians that entered
Jordan in the years following 1948 is necessary to put the refugee crisis into perspective. After
the UN passed the resolution in 1947 that would allow for the creation of a Jewish state, “Zionist
leaders feared such numbers of non-Jews would threaten the stability of the new state both
militarily—and socially—insofar as a substantial Muslim and Christian minority would
challenge the new state’s Jewish character.”34 The creation of Israel is the ultimate root of the
hostilities between the Arabs and the Jews. It is the foundation of the Palestinian refugee crisis
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that Jordan experienced after 1948. Huge numbers of Palestinians began to leave their homes to
seek refuge elsewhere. There are not reliable and concrete estimates of how many of the refugees
from the 1948 wave came to Jordan; however, it is clear that many descendants of this first wave
remain refugees in Jordan. Millions of Palestinian refugees are registered as such with United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Since its
founding in 1946, Jordan has been heavily involved in refugee relations, acquiring important
experience and knowledge in the field.
The events of and following 1948 fit Jacobsen’s criteria, qualifying the mass migration as
a refugee influx because thousands of Palestinians came into Jordan in a relatively short period of
time. Jordan garnered a government response, according to Jacobsen, because it enacted and
implemented specific refugee policies.
King Abdullah I of Jordan, the first king of independent Jordan and the former leader of
Transjordan, had vested interests in acquiring additional territories for his state. These territories
included parts of modern day Syria, Iraq, and Palestine. Abdullah I became interested in
acquiring Palestinian territories “when Britain suggested that Palestine might be partitioned
between Arabs and Jews and that Abdullah might rule the Arab part.”35 Political incentives of
governing a united Arab community under Hashemite authority drove Abdullah to annex the
West Bank in 1949.36 After Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank,37 Abdullah I decided to grant
citizenship to the Palestinians to those in the West Bank and those in the East Bank. The
monarchy devised land records to “help determine what Palestinians [were] eligible for
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residence…by providing who is a ‘legitimate’ West Banker of descendant or such a person.”38
When compared to Jacobsen’s model, the Jordanian land policies fit into the “positive” decision
type. First, Jordan’s guarantee of citizenship to the Palestinians demonstrated that Jordan wished
to assimilate the refugees into Jordanian culture and politics. However, there is some controversy
surrounding these land policies, for some believe that the Jordanian government granted
citizenship as an attempt to destroy Palestinian identity.39 Although this citizenship policy falls
under Jacobsen’s “positive” policy type, it also carries significant implications that reflect
Abdullah’s expansionist mindset.
By October 1950, the Palestinian refugee influx increased the population in Amman,
Jordan’s capital, from “50,000 in early 1948 to 120,000.”40 The UN Disaster Relief Fund had
taken the responsibility of looking after the Palestinian refugees in Jordan, but UNRWA formed
in May of 1950, thus taking responsibility of the Palestinians.41 The fact that Jordan allowed
international refugee organizations to operate within its borders further demonstrates its positive
policy response. Jacobsen, in her general model for refugee crisis management, specifically
mentions, “Islam in particular has strong positive traditions concerning the offering of temporary
refuge or asylum from political persecution.”42 In addition, Arab tribal traditions’ foundations are
in hospitality and providing help to others.43 These two characteristics common in many Arab
states serve as a part of the explanation as to why Jordan chooses positive refugee responses.
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Since UNRWA is an international organization, it inherently is accountable to the
international community, which is Jacobsen’s first source of pressure put on host governments.
To reiterate, the first source of pressure on host governments consists of institutions and
individuals in the international community that advocate for the welfare of refugees. Today,
UNRWA provides crucial services for the Palestinian refugees, such as education, vocational
training, housing, healthcare, and foodstuffs. This relief aid has “proved essential to restart a new
life, often from scratch”44 for the Palestinian people living in Jordan after 1948. For instance,
UNRWA has been the main healthcare provider for the Palestinian refugees in Jordan since
1950. These basic services that UNRWA provides to the Palestinian refugees in Jordan are the
results of international pressure on the Jordanian government to cooperate with such
organizations.
In a sense, Jordan had no choice but to cooperate with IROs due to its lack of resources,
which could strain its political stability. This stream of events reflects Jacobsen’s second source
of pressure—that from the local community. The Jordanian community recognized its limited
structural ability, taking into account the nature of its limited physical and economic capacity.
For example, Jordan’s physical landscape is arid, making only two percent suitable for
agriculture. This limited agricultural capacity means that Jordan has to rely heavily on food
imports, which denotes higher food prices. This type of structural incapacity, as Jacobsen states,
could affect the willingness of the local community to host a mass refugee influx.45 There may
have been pressure from the local community after the 1948 influx for the Jordanian government
to negotiate with and accept the assistance from organizations from UNRWA, thus pressuring for
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a positive policy response toward international refugee organizations.46 Arguably, the first and
second sources of pressure are the most influential over a government’s refugee policy. With the
first source, a host government faces the scrutiny and potential ostracism from the international
community. The local community is the most affected source of pressure because the refugee
crisis directly affects its access to key resources like food, water, and shelter.
Jacobsen’s model discusses refugee repatriation in her analysis of state responses to
refugee crises. A positive response would be the host country actively pursuing and streamlining
the repatriation process. However, a negative response concerning repatriation would be for the
host country to force refugees to return to their home countries or to make it extremely difficult
to stay in its own country by placing barriers to complicate finding residency or employment. 47
Jordan, in response to the 1948 wave of Palestinians, did not make its decisions based on black
and white circumstances. The government ultimately carried out a blend of the above referenced
policies concerning repatriation. Since King Abdullah I annexed the West Bank in 1950, Jordan
had control over those 700,000 Palestinians who fled from the newly partitioned Israel. The
Palestinians in Jordan had “no strong affinity to the Hashemites,”48 and this dissonance
contributed to the varying policy approaches. While the king wished to gain administration over
more people to expand the Hashemite kingdom, many Palestinians wished to return to their
homes. Even though the Jordanian monarchy granted citizenship to hundreds of thousands of
Palestinians, “this lack of a cohesive ethnic or religious base has given the Hashemites myriad of
difficulties in shaping a national entity,”49 making it even more difficult to implement a
utilitarian settlement policy. The East Bankers, those native to Jordan before its independence,
46
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and the Palestinians clashed from the beginning of the 1948 refugee influx. King Hussein, a
grandson of King Abdullah I, attempted to resolve the tension between East Bankers and West
Bankers by “co-opting leaders of prominent families and tribes into his government.”50 Under
King Hussein, Jordan held parliamentary elections in 1989; these were the first elections since
the 1950s. Jordan held these elections in an attempt to begin political liberalization through free
elections.51 This political integration aligns with Jacobsen’s model in that it indirectly made it
easier for Palestinians to integrate into Jordanian society through easing the insecurities of their
opponents.
By comparing the 1948 wave of Palestinian refugees to the Jacobsen model, it is clear
that Jordan had positive responses to the refugee influx. The positive responses have led to
largely positive outcomes for the refugees. There are millions of Palestinians in Jordan many of
whom are direct descendants of the 1948 refugee influx. 52 The Jordanian government is one of
the only governments to fully integrate Palestinians into its sociopolitical environment. The
government did so with the 1948 refugee influx by permitting them citizenship and permanent
residency, and these policies set the precedent for subsequent refugee waves that would confront
Jordan in the future.
1967 Palestinian Refugees
The main event that triggered the second major influx of refugees into Jordan was the Six
Day War of 1967. This conflict led around 300,000 Palestinian refugees to surge into Jordan
seeking asylum.53 The war lasted from June 5 to June 10, 1967, and the belligerents signed a
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ceasefire on June 11, 1967. On one side was Israel and on the other were Egypt, Syria, Jordan,
Iraq, and Lebanon. The Arab side of the conflict “talked of launching a people’s war of liberation
to solve the Palestine problem,” which led to the Israeli attack on the West Bank village of Samu
on November 13, 1966.54 This attack on Jordanian occupied territory subsequently led to a sharp
division between Palestinians and the Jordanian government, for it “exposed the relative
weakness of [Jordan’s] army…[and demonstrated its] inability to protect [the Palestinians], or
provide them with the means to protect themselves.”55 The lack of trust between the Palestinians
and the Jordanian government continued until the war broke out in 1967.
Ultimately, the Six Day War resulted in Jordan’s loss of the West Bank and East
Jerusalem to Israeli control. On June 5th, the Jordanian military, along with forces from Egypt
and Syria, foolishly attacked Israeli forces, and by June 8th, Israel had taken the West Bank.
Following the events at Samu, this additional blow to Jordan’s military strength exacerbated the
divide between Jordan and the Palestinians.56 Jordan lost 40 percent of its gross domestic product
(GDP), 50 percent of its industrial capacity, and 25 percent of its arable land after it lost control
of the West Bank.57 The Six Day War would be one of Jordan’s last attempts to “determine the
trend for the region [and]...channel its efforts into trying to bring about the necessary
circumstances to prevent war and to expedite diplomacy.”58 Domestic constraints and conflicts
soon shadowed Jordan’s epiphany concerning its role in Middle Eastern relations.
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Palestinians flooded by the tens of thousands into Jordan after Israel retook the West
Bank. In general, other Arab states have “formally resisted resettlement or naturalization as a
solution to the refugee problem,”59 distinguishing them from Jordan’s positive refugee policies.
Following the 1967 war, Jordan allowed Palestinians across its borders once again. However, the
refugees remained in camps—mainly the Jerash camp to the north of Amman.60 The 1967 wave
did not receive residency rights from the Jordanian government, which demonstrates a key
change in policy type—according to the Jacobsen model. Jordan did not grant the 1967 refugees
citizenship like it did for the 1948 refugees because it was under the pretext that the Palestinians
would return to Palestinian territories. They had the right to return, so the government avoided
structural costs associated with providing citizenship to mass numbers of refugees.61 This policy
change took an administrative hold when King Hussein “call[ed] for ‘administrative
disengagement’ from the occupied territories in 1988.”62 Hussein’s negative policy included
making Palestinian residents’ in the West Bank passports temporary rather than a proof of
citizenship.63 This stricter regulation made it so Jordan considered Palestinians from the West
Bank only to be travelers, and Jordan required the refugees to have visas to remain in the
country. These new restrictions also affected the West Bankers who resided in Jordan already,
for it revoked their access to work in the public sector, to social benefits, and government
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services. 64 According to Jacobsen’s model, Hussein’s 1988 regulations reveals a shift from a
positive to a negative policy type on Jordan’s part.
The loss of the West Bank in 1967, as aforementioned, was a significant economic loss
and a burden to Jordan. Jordan had “allocated about one-third of the Development Budget to the
West Bank,” which the Israeli occupation of the West Bank squandered. This loss combined with
the mass influx of refugees strained Jordan’s structural capacity to absorb negative costs. To deal
with these costs on Jordan’s economy, the international community responded to the refugee
crisis by providing foreign aid in the form of grants and other forms of financial aid.65 Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya pooled their funds and “provid[ed] an annual grant of 40 million
pounds sterling ($112 million)”66 to Jordan in the wake of its massive economic losses. The
United States gave aid to benefit refugees, and West Germany also gave to the refugees in
addition to further assistance for Jordan’s development projects—amounting to $59 million.67
Assistance from the international community compelled Jordan to continue its relatively positive
refugee policies. When compared to Jacobsen’s model, it is clear that international influence
played a significant role in Jordan’s decision-making and capacity to deal with the 1967 refugee
influx.
According to Jacobsen’s refugee commentary, “A community’s historical experience
both with earlier refugee influxes and as refugees themselves is likely to influence its
receptiveness.”68 This statement directly relates to Jordan’s developing status as a refugee state,
as mass waves of refugees have consistently flowed into Jordan. Furthermore, it points out that
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the community in the host country pressures the host government to make certain decisions. For
example, the aforementioned issue of national identity for Palestinians continues to be a problem
since the 1948 refugee influx. East Bank nationals support the idea of an independent Palestinian
state and that Palestinians “should get Palestinian passports once there is a state, and should only
receive Jordanian citizenship if they apply for it and are accepted.”69 This reluctance from
Jordanian nationals to assimilate Palestinians constitutes an influential pressure on the Jordanian
monarchy.
Contemporary Palestinian-Jordanian Relations
The relationship between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Jordanian
government demonstrates the importance of Jacobsen’s other two sources of pressure—other
than the international community. The Arab League created the PLO to encompass “all
Palestinian organizations—commando groups, trade unions, professional associations, as well as
national figures.”70 These parts of the PLO gather and collaborate to achieve Palestinians’
interests. Today, however, the PLO does not include Hamas of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
which were meant to liberate Palestinian territories from Israel and to destroy the state of Israel,
respectively. The Arab League established the PLO in 1964 to organize the Palestinian liberation
cause across national borders, including Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait, and others. The PLO’s
overarching goal has evolved to embrace an autonomous Palestinian state through its own
military, finance, politics, and administration.71 In the early 1970s, the Jordanian government and
the PLO clashed, for Jordan “forbade PLO political, military and other mobilization activities
within its territories.” This policy, that directly impacted refugees in Jordan, exemplifies the
mixed policy types that Jordan implemented.
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When the relationship between the Jordanian monarchy and the East Bankers wavers, the
monarchy goes to great lengths to salvage and ease the relationship. The PLO has strained the
relationship by widening the gap between the traditional Hashemites and the Palestinian
condition. The civil war, known as Black September, began in September of 1970 and continued
until July of 1971 between the PLO and the Jordanian monarchy. Several negative conditions led
to the outbreak of the civil war, including inequitable job opportunities for Palestinians and
misrepresented seats in parliament. Gerrymandered electoral districts, and discrimination toward
Palestinians.72 The Jordanian government won the civil war, and most leading member of the
PLO retreated to Lebanon.73 Despite the monarchy’s victory over the PLO in the 1980s and
1990s, King Hussein “moved toward a limited democracy, balancing the interests of his ‘guest’
Palestinian constituents” and indigenous Jordanians.74 Hussein’s proposal of a limited
democracy, a system where the king “expanded political limits but still controlled the [election]
process,” was an attempt to subdue and prevent future uprisings and dissent from Palestinians.75
As a result of the limited democracy, the Jordanian monarchy has the power to gloss over
Palestinian representation in favor of the tribal candidates.76 Since the end of Black September,
Palestinian popular protests and demonstrations have been small and infrequent. However, those
known as the East Bankers, indigenous Jordanians, have protested against and blamed
Palestinians for the rising cost of living and the spread of corruption. They expressed their
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dissent on a day known as the Day of Anger in 2011.77 Other regional Arab Spring movement
inspired thousands of Jordanians to gather all over the country to show their disdain of economic
and political policies.78 It is a widely known fact that the Palestinians dominate the private,
business sector of the Jordanian economy, and the indigenous Jordanians dominate the public
sector.79 The ethnic divide within the Jordanian economy has caused political disparities between
the often wealthier Palestinians and the indigenous Jordanians. The International Crisis Group
described that several of the people’s grievances concerned government corruption among “a
narrow business-state elite…[that] enrich[ed] itself through corrupt privatization deals,”80
claiming government favoritism for the Palestinians involved in the private sector. In response to
the Day of Anger protests, King Abdullah II, son of King Hussein, “slashed prices and taxes on
some foods and fuels…to help ease the burden on the poor,” demonstrating that the king was
engaged and constructively responsive to the demands of five thousand protestors.81
Iraqi Refugees
Less than ten years passed from King Hussein’s formal renunciation of Jordan’s claims
over the West Bank to yet another wave of refugees—this time from Iraq. There are two major
Iraqi refugee influxes between the 1990s and the early 2000s; these influxes were the results of
the Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War, respectively. Jordan’s history as a state of asylum for
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refugees shaped its policies toward future waves that it would face in the future. The 1990-1991
Gulf War led “[one] million Iraqis and foreigners working in Iraq” to flee to Jordan in two
months.82 The Gulf War started in August of 1990 as a result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
The Iraqi invasion led to incredible scrutiny from the international community, so much so that
the United Nations imposed an embargo on Iraq.83
The UN trade embargo on Iraq is a significant demonstration on how the international
community can have an influential impact on government decision-making. The embargo “had a
particularly severe effect on Iraq’s economy and food security levels of the population,” causing
about a million people to leave Iraq. According to UNICEF (United Nations Children’s
Emergency Fund), the per capita income in Iraq dropped from $3510 in 1989 to $450 in 1996.”84
Not being able to import its regular food supply, Iraq introduced a food rationing system of 1,000
per day per person; furthermore, the Iraqi population then became dependent on the food rations
for survival.85 This massive reduction in per capita income and the heightened food insecurity
served as catalysts to the Iraqi exodus to Jordan in the early 1990s.
By 2002 the UNHCR estimated about 300,000 Iraqis in Jordan, which had a population
of 5,000,000 at the time.86 This Iraqi migration qualifies, under Jacobsen’s criteria, as a refugee
influx, for it occurred within two short months. The following section demonstrates that Jordan’s
policies toward Iraqi refugees underwent an evolution—from initially unresponsive, to negative,
to positive government responses.
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The border between Jordan and Iraq remained relatively porous, for “Jordanian
authorities…barely acknowledged the presence and transit of this vast number of migrants.”87
Jacobsen’s model would constitute this government reaction as nonresponsive. However, this
seemingly unresponsive government reaction to the mass refugee influx proved to be a façade
put on by the Jordanian government. The government instead pushed the “Jordanian public [and]
foreign and national relief agencies…to [concentrate] their operations on the poorer sectors of
the Jordanian population.”88 The monarchy pushed third parties to focus aid and resources on
other groups other than the Iraqi refugees, diverting attention away from the crisis. Jordan made
these negative policy decisions to attempt to channel the effects of international pressure on its
actions. These negative policy decisions included funneling international aid to different sectors
of the Jordanian population other than the new refugee population and failing to recognize Iraqis
as refugees but guests instead. However, it allowed refugees to cross its borders and inhabit its
territories regardless. Under Jacobsen’s model, the fact that the Jordanian government continued
to permit the refugees to come in to the country reinforces the idea that its policy types toward
refugees remained relatively positive. Jordan’s government response to Iraqi refugees went
through an evolution—from non-responsive to negative, to positive. The negative response was a
reaction to Jordan’s threatened resources and structural capacity to cope. It was not, however, a
sustained policy response because Jordan eventually engaged in negotiations with international
organizations, like the UN, to attain additional resources. The complete evolution of Jordan’s
response to both Iraqi refugee crises does not define Jordan’s positive response type until the end
of the 2003 Iraqi refugee influx has run its course—around 2009.

87
88

Chatelard, 22-23.
Ibid., 23. These poorer sectors include Palestinian refugees from the 1948 and 1967 influxes.

27
The effects of the 1990 Gulf War refugee crisis in Jordan rolled over into the next Iraqi
refugee crisis that came with the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003. The 2003 refugee influx
strained Jordan’s economic and social capacity even further than the 1990 influx. The United
States’ policies toward its invasion of Iraq were meant to restructure Iraqi systems and society,
“creating the Iraq that this policy…imagined.”89 For instance, US forces preserved and protected
those Iraqi institutions and systems that would serve US interests “while allowing facilities
critical to either Iraqi state functionality or national cohesion to be looted down to the office
furniture.”90 This ‘imagined community’ led to the collapse of Iraqi institutions and social
cohesion by putting sectarian and foreign policy objectives before a functioning state. 91
The state that the United States tried to create eliminated the Iraqi people’s sense of
security and safety, causing them to leave Iraq en masse. The 2003 war in Iraq caused as many as
2.2 million people to exit Iraq—most of them seeking refuge in Syria and Jordan.92 Of those,
between 450,000 and 750,000 Iraqis came to Jordan. There has been significant debate between
the Jordanian government and international organizations, like the UN, as to the exact numbers
of refugees that came to Jordan after 2003. Nonetheless, this mass migration of Iraqis into Jordan
qualifies as a mass refugee influx under Jacobsen’s model. As discussed previously, according to
Géraldine Chatelard, there are two motivations that drive the Jordanian government’s perception
of the refugees’ presence:
…a vision of their [the refugees’] role as predators on the scarce natural and
economic resources of Jordan and a primary force in driving up prices of goods
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and properties legitimizes claims to international assistance to ‘relieve’ the burden
on Jordan.93
Host governments often confront this type of dilemma—to exaggerate the numbers to get
more aid or to protect resources. In these types of situations, pressure comes from both
the host government to international organizations and from the Jordanian people to the
government, calling for solutions to resource shortages, or Jacobsen’s structural capacity.
The Jordanian government’s history of attempting to appease and include both the
Palestinians and the East Bankers has demonstrated its dedication to minimizing the
negative effects of mass migration. While King Hussein took an interest in Palestinian
refugees as political and territorial assets, the refugee crisis that transpires as a result of
the US invasion of Iraq led the monarchy to view refugees as a “security or economic
issue rather than a humanitarian one.”94 The government became more concerned with its
ability to absorb hundreds of thousands of new residents. This shift in the perception of
refugees is further explored in subsequent sections with statements from the Jordanian
Minister of Interior.
International aid, like the United States Agency for International Development’s
(USAID) school program, began to seek cooperation from the Jordanian government to
supplement Jordan’s already sparse resources.95 The monarchy dealt with and received the Iraqi
refugees with an attitude of tolerance rather than one of acceptance like with the Palestinians in
the 20th century. In the early 2000s, the Jordanian government considered the refugees “guests,”
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denoting the temporary nature of their stay in Jordan.96 Despite their status as “guests” in Jordan,
the Iraqi refugees garnered much international attention and international aid. This international
aid came in the form of direct monetary donations and assistance from nongovernmental
organizations (NGO). Some scholars, like Jeff Crisp of the University of Oxford Refugee Studies
Centre, assert that there is a politics to the numerical estimates of refugees that host countries
posit. Crisp states that host governments inflate the number of refugees in their countries to
…embarrass the government of the country of asylum and to besmirch its human
rights record; to attract large amounts of humanitarian assistance into the country,
which can then be siphoned off to members of the political, military and business
elite; to provide employment to large numbers of bureaucrats and refugee camp
workers, many of whom would otherwise be without work or an income; to
ensure a generous supply of food and other relief items to exiled groups which are
engaged in political and military campaigns against their country of origin; to
maximize the amount of foreign exchange brought into the country by
humanitarian agencies, which can subsequently be converted at rates favourable
to the government; and to cast the most favourable light possible on the country’s
commitment to humanitarian norms, thereby bolstering its international reputation
and external support.97
Jordan received intense international attention for the Iraqi refugee crisis of 2003 and
onward, but some accused its government of “hijack[ing] the aid and redirect[ing] it
toward favored national programs.”98 Jordan acted within the bounds of tolerance, using
international assistance to its benefit.
In 2007, the Jordanian Minister of Interior, Id al-Fayiz, made this distinction of
Iraqis seeking asylum in Jordan, “refus[ing] to label Iraqis in Jordan as refugees, but
rather brethren and guests in the kingdom with full respect until their ordeal ends…[and
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they are] allow[ed] to go back to their country.”99 Al-Fayiz’s statement is a representation
and demonstration of Jordan’s sometimes mixed policy types toward refugees. Jordan
permitted refugees to cross its borders and to somewhat assimilate into its community;
however, it stressed the economic strain that the Iraqis put on Jordan, thus fortifying its
reluctance to recognize them officially as refugees. By granting official refugee status to
Iraqis, Jordan would be responsible for providing certain services under UNHCR
regulations. The 1951 Refugee Convention officially defined who qualified as a refugee
and what their respective rights were as such. Article thirty-three in the 1951 convention
details the principle of refoulement. The refoulement principle prohibits host countries
from refugee expulsion from or forcible return to the origin country if their lives or
freedom “would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular group or political opinion.”100 This is the type of issue that the convention
addresses, but Jordan was not a signatory at the time of the post-2003 refugee influx and
is not one as of 2016. If Jordan was a signatory, then the provisions therein per
international law would bind it to these types of responsibilities. Despite the fact that
Jordan is not a member of the 1951 UN convention concerning refugees, its policy types
remained within Jacobsen’s positive policy classification by allowing refugees to cross its
borders, tolerating mild assimilation, and cooperating with international refugee
organizations during the Iraqi refugee influxes.
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Syrian Refugees: 2011 to the Present
The current refugee crisis is largely a result of the Syrian Civil War, which started in
2011. Millions of Syrians displaced Syrians have fled their homes to escape the brutal conflict
between rebels and President Bashar al-Assad’s government. As of February 2015, over 622,000
Syrians have registered as refugees in Jordan.101 In 2015 Jordan’s population was 8.1 million
according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook. The CIA inflated the size
of the Jordanian population to include the increased flow of Syrian refugees into Jordan.102
The Syrian Civil War began during the Arab Spring when the Syrian people held several
popular uprisings that turned violent in March of 2011. Between March and December 2011, the
UN high commissioner for human rights “estimated that more than 4,000 people, including 307
children have been killed…since the uprising erupted against the government of President
Bashar al-Assad,”103 and the government has detained about 14,000 people.104 The original
protests demanded that al-Assad’s government embrace democratic political reforms, shadowing
the protests in Egypt and Tunisia. In March 2011 the Arab Spring seemed like a promising
platform from which comprehensive political reform could arise. However, the Syrian
government “started firing live ammunition at crowds… [and] arresting and torturing
protestors,”105
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In addition, Jordan has constructed several Syrian refugee camps, such as Zaatari in
Amman. King Abdullah II has worked closely with international organizations, like UNHCR, to
manage the huge refugee influxes it receives every day. Jordan has established naturalization
processes for Palestinians, refugee camps for Syrians, and several other mechanisms for
managing refugee crises. These actions have demonstrated Jordan’s relatively hospitable nature
towards refugee populations. However, Jordan’s resources, already environmentally and
economically limited, have become even more strained after generations of refugee crises.
In line with Jacobsen’s three sources of pressure (international, local, and refugee), King
Abdullah II has expressed the strain that Syrian refugees have had on Jordan’s services,
infrastructure, and economy. Before a donor conference on the Syrian conflict in February 2016,
Abdullah II stated, “it’s [the refugee crisis] gotten to a boiling point… [and] sooner or later…the
dam is going to burst.”106 He called on the international community to offer additional assistance
if Jordan was to continue to accept Syrian refugees. The Jordanian government cannot hope to
assimilate Syrians into the job market without providing similar opportunities to Jordanians.
Providing all working-age Syrians with work permits could take jobs away from Jordanians,
which could lead to popular unrest and potential violent demonstrations. To solve this dilemma,
Abdullah II promised Jordanians “For every job the government offered Syrian refugees, it
would create five jobs for Jordanians.”107 In this scenario, it is pressure from Jordan’s local
community, as a result of structural limitations, that is putting the most pressure on government
decisions. At the conference, the UN stated that it sought $7.7 billion to “fund aid operations for
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22.5 million people in Syria and neighbouring countries next year.”108 The king has asked for
international assistance to handle the crisis, aligning with Jacobsen’s model having to do with
international components. Donors pledged to give “$2.1 billion to Jordan over the next three
years;”109 however, Jordan stated that the aid would come with certain stipulations, like jobs for
200,000 Syrians. Because the monarchy has reached out to the international community,110
namely the hosts of the conference (United Kingdom, Germany, Norway, Kuwait, and the UN),
it further demonstrates its positive policy type and willingness to find solutions to the current
crisis.
Jordanian Case and Jacobsen’s Model
Making comprehensive, equitable, and efficient refugee policy is incredibly difficult
because the government must take into consideration economic, political, social, and
humanitarian issues simultaneously. Refugee absorption demands that the host country be able to
structurally, fiscally, and socially accept mass numbers of people. Irrefutably, Jordan has
confronted these types of issues—as aforementioned, housing shortages and social unrest. King
Hussein’s restrictions on Palestinian passports in the late 1980s and King Abdullah II’s policies
that diverted the international community’s attention away from the Iraqi refugee crisis were
examples of negative policy types according to Jacobsen’s model. However, these negative
policies were almost a direct reaction to Jordan’s own sparse resources. King Hussein’s passport
regulations after his 1988 renunciation of claims over the West Bank were a response Jordan’s
inability to permanently accept Palestinians. He made these regulations with the expectation that
Palestinians would eventually return to the West Bank. By diverting the international
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community’s attention away from the Iraqi refugee crisis, the Jordanian government was able to
funnel international aid to the poorer members of the Jordanian population. These negative,
according to Jacobsen, policy types were not because Jordan did not have the desire or will to
tolerate and accept refugees; they were because the refugees threatened to overwhelm Jordan’s
stability and capacity to absorb large numbers of people.
Jordan’s positive policy decisions are its attempts to manage these capacity issues it faced
with the Iraqis and Palestinians and continues to face with the Syrian refugees.111 These positive
policies are demonstrations of Jordan’s consistent, accepting, and solution-driven mindset when
dealing with refugees. Though the Jordanian monarchy exhibited some remnants of negative
policy types, according to Jacobsen’s model, its ultimate policy type is positive. Jordan’s laws
and cooperation with international organizations clearly demonstrate its dedication to easing
refugee relations as much as it is able according to its economic, political, and social capacity.
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Conclusion
The model of host government decision making outlined in Karen Jacobsen’s paper,
“Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee Influxes,” is a
concise, all-inclusive set of guidelines that help evaluate Jordan’s approach to refugee influxes.
Her model is not overly complex, for it only identifies three policy types that host governments
usually adopt—positive, negative, or non-reactant. However, it breaks down those three policy
types into three additional categories that are easily defined and recognized. As discussed in the
theory section of this paper, these three subcategories are legal-bureaucratic responses,
involvement of international refugee organizations, and the admission and treatment of
refugees.112 Overwhelmingly, Jordan has chosen and implemented refugee policy that aligns
with Jacobsen’s positive policy types. Jordan’s constitution outlines procedures for refugee
assimilation, admits asylum seekers, cooperates with the UNHCR to facilitate repatriation, and
attempts to establish the potential for local settlement or permanent residence. Ultimately, Jordan
has undergone an evolution, involving some trial and error, to an overwhelmingly positive policy
response to mass refugee influxes. This may be a fascinating topic for further research—whether
Jordan became path dependent upon its decisions it made with the 1948 Palestinian refugee
wave. The positive policies that Jordan implemented, like granting Palestinians Jordanian
citizenship, were practical and territorially strategic at the time but persisted through subsequent
refugee influxes. This path dependence might explain why Jordan has continued to pursue a
positive policy type throughout its history of refugee influxes.
Because Jacobsen’s model is clean cut and intelligible, one is able to recognize and
define Jordan’s general positive policy attitude. Her model will aid the international community
as a whole in distinguishing and identifying governments’, not just Jordan’s, refugee policy
112

See Appendix A for the full chart of Jacobsen’s possible state responses.
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decision making. Jacobsen points out “changes taking place in both the local community and the
international arena will affect policymaking, as do the shifting linkages between the government,
the local community, and the international organizations.”113 This statement successfully
highlights the main benefit that her model provides—to help both the international community
and host governments cope with the growing refugee burden.
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Jacobsen, 674.

37
Appendix A
Jacobsen Model Outline
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